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Investment  is  key  to  policy  analysis  for  at  least  two  reasons.  First,  it  is  the  source  of  capital 
accumulation,  and  therefore  a major  determinant  of  both  the  economy’s  long-run  output  capacity 
and  the  productivity  of  the  labor  force.  Second,  as  a large  and  volatile  component  of  aggregate 
demand,  fluctuations  of  investment  have  a major  influence  on  the  short-run  path  of  the  business 
cycle. 
For  these  reasons,  investment  has  been  the  subject  of much  economic  research  over  past  decades, 
and  it  has  been  the  focus  of  significant  policy  debate.  Of  late,  discussions  linking  policy  and 
investment  have  been  near  the  top  of  the  policy  agenda,  most  importantly  because  of  the  widely 
held  view  that  the  federal  budget  deficit  competes  for  the  scarce  pool  of private  saving  and  raises 
interest  rates.  The  concern  that  higher  interest  rates  will  increase  firms’  cost  of  capital  and 
therefore  “crowd-out”  private  investment  is,  for  many  economists  and  policymakers,  the  primary 
reason  for  cutting  the  federal  budget  deficit.  Also,  the  concern  that  higher  deficits  will  weaken 
investment  in  the  long  run  has  handcuffed  proposals  to  employ  stimulative  fiscal  policy  in 
response  to  the  1990s  stagnation. 
Furthermore,  although  the  fervor  behind  “supply-side”  economics  of  the  1980s  has  quieted  to 
some  degree,  the  assumed  sensitivity  of  investment  to  the  after-tax  cost  of  capital  is  still  a 
cornerstone  of  tax  policy  in  some  circles.  If  taxes  are  cut  on  the  returns  from  saving  and investment,  the  argument  goes,  the  expansion  of  investment  and  the  capital  stock  will  ultimately 
benefit  the  entire  economy  by  increasing  output,  improving  labor  productivity,  and  raising  wages. 
Indeed,  the  Bush  administration  lobbied  for  a capital  gains  tax  cut  on  the  basis  of  this  reasoning. 
The  1993  tax  changes  also  create  a preference  for  capital  gains  by  raising  the  tax  rates  on  the 
wealthy  for  labor  income,  while  keeping  the  top  marginal  tax  rate  on  capital  gains  income  at 28 
percent.  The  direct  beneficiaries  of  such  tax  initiatives,  however,  may  well  be  wealthy  taxpayers 
who  save  substantial  amounts  or  have  large  claims  on  capital  income.’ 
These  influential  policy  positions  take  for  granted  that  the  cost  of  capital-appropriately  adjusted 
for  taxes  and  inflation-is  a fundamental  (if not  the fundamental)  determinant  of investment:  The 
importance  of  this  effect  is  largely  unquestioned  in  policy  circles.  While  standard  economic 
theory  predicts  a link  between  capital  costs  and  investment,  the  theory  in  its  most  general  form 
does  not  make  any  quantitative  predictions  about  how  strong  the  link  will  be.  Although  some 
empirical  work  has  addressed  this  issue,  the  results  to  date  have  been  mixed. 
This  paper  analyzes  the  existing  literature  on  investment  and  presents  original  research  to  assess 
the  economic  foundations  of  current  policy  debates.  I find  that  the  largely  exclusive  emphasis  on 
the  cost  of  capital  in  most  current  discussions  is  unjustified.  The  evidence  shows  that  interest 
rates  and  the  cost  of  capital  play  a  small  and  uncertain  role  in  the  determination  of  investment 
when  compared  with  the  strength  of  firms’  financial  condition  and  the  growth  of  their  sales.  The 
impact  of  policy  through  the  standard  cost-of-capital  channel,  therefore,  may  well  be  dominated 
by  other  factors. Furthermore,  the  determinants  of  investment  differ  across  firms.  The  capital  spending  of  the 
fastest-growing  firms  studied  appears  to  show  no  negative  effects  of  higher  interest  rates  or 
capital  costs.  These  firms,  however,  are  the  most  sensitive  to  alternative  sales  and  financial 
determinants  of  investment.  The  fastest-growing  firms  may,  therefore,  be  the  most  severely 
affected  by  reduced  economic  growth  resulting  from  deficit  reduction,  while  their  level  of 
investment  benefits  little  from  lower  interest  rates.  One  must  pay  attention  to  this  heterogeneity 
when  studying  policy. 
The  policy  lessons  of  these  findings  are  developed  in more  detail  in  the  final  section  of  the  brief. 
In  summary,  I emphasize  three  major  points: 
1. The  most  important  determinant  of  investment  is  the  strength  of  the  economy.  The  indirect 
impact  of  taxation  and  spending  initiatives  on  overall  economic  activity  is likely  to have  a greater 
effect  on  investment  than  the  influence  of  taxes  or  interest  rates  on  the  cost  of  capital. 
2. For  similar  reasons,  the  negative  (“crowding-out”)  effect  of  government  deficits  on  investment 
is  likely  to  be  small.  Moreover,  in  the  current  weak  economy,  the  drag  on  the  economy  from  tax 
increases  and  government  spending  cuts  will  probably  overshadow  any  stimulus  to  investment 
that  occurs  from  falling  interest  rates.  Therefore,  in  today’s  economy,  deficit  cutting  is  more 
likely  to  reduce  investment  than  to  increase  it.  [This  conclusion  is  supported  by  an  illustrative 
simulation  of  the  possible  effects  of  the  recently  passed  Budget  Reconciliation  Act  of  1993;  see 
Table  21. 3.  Policy  to  stimulate  investment  directly  should  focus  on  robust  policies  designed  to  get  cash 
into  the  hands  of  investing  firms.  Accelerated  depreciation  allowances  and  the  investment  tax 
credit  are  examples  of  this  kind  of  policy  since  they  not  only  reduce  the  cost  of  capital,  but  also 
increase  firms’  cash  flow.  Tax  changes  designed  to  increase  saving,  however,  are  not  robust  in 
this  sense.  They  must  work  solely  through  the  empirically  weak  cost-of-capital  channel. 
Therefore,  we  could  incur  the  distributional  costs  of  regressive  tax  reform  (designed  to  raise 
saving),  without  much  benefit  in  terms  of  increased  investment. 
II.  Do  We  Need  More  Investment? 
This  research  explores  the  determinants  of  private  investment  and  the  impact  of  policy  on 
investment.  Yet  there  is  a  background  issue  that  must  be  addressed,  at  least  briefly,  before 
proceeding.  Why  should  public  policy  strive  to  stimulate  investment  in  the  U.S.  during  the 
199Os? 
Historical  statistics  show  that  investment  has  been  weak  in  recent  years.  In  spite  of  the  fact  that 
the  early  1980s  experienced  two  recessions-with  the  second  widely  thought  to  be  more  severe 
than  the  1990-91  recession-gross  nonresidential  investment  relative  to  GDP  averaged  6.3 
percent  less  from  1987  to  1992  than  it  did  from  1980  to  1986.  Its  level  in  1991  and  1992  was 
below  the  trough  reached  following  the  1981-82  recession.  2 Other  measures  lead  to  similar 
conclusions.  For  example  Harris  and  Steindel  (1991,  p.  6) report  that  “net  capital  supplies”  from both  foreign  and  domestic  sources  dropped  from  an  average  of  6.5  percent  of  GNP  during 
1953-79  to  an  average  of  4.0  percent  of  GNP  from  1980-89.  (Their  figures  for  domestic  capital 
supply  alone  were  worse,  dropping  from  7.2  to  3.0  percent  of  GNP  for  the  same  period.) 
There  is  surprising  agreement  across  the  political  spectrum  that  policy  should  attempt  to  boost 
investment,  in  spite  of  sharp  differences  over  the  optimal  means  to pursue  this  goal.  The  Reagan 
and  Bush  administrations  proposed  to  increase  investment  and  economic  growth  by  lowering 
taxes  (especially  those  on  capital  gains)  and  deregulation:  “A major  suspect  in the slowdown  of 
U.S.  productivity  growth  is  thus  to  be found...in  the  capital  markets.  To  raise  the  rate  of 
productivity  growth,  the national  rate of investment  should  be increased’” (Economic  Report  of 
the President,  1992, p. 93, emphasis  in the  original).  During  the  1992 presidential  campaign,  even 
Democratic  candidates  Bill  Clinton,  Paul  Tsongas,  and  Jerry  Brown  embraced  capital  gains  tax 
cuts  in  some  form  to  stimulate  investment.  Benjamin  Friedman,  a critic  of the  Reagan-Bush  fiscal 
policies,  argues  that  as  a  result  of  low  investment  in  the  198Os,  “productivity  gains  have 
continued  to  be  disappointing  and  wages  have  lagged”  (1991,  p.  150).  Murray  Weidenbaum,  the 
first  chair  of  the  Council  of  Economic  Advisers  during  the  Reagen  administration,  has  called  for 
a  temporary  investment  tax  credit  on  “produc-tivity-enhancing  equipment  for  manufacturing 
companies”  (quoted  by  Youngblood,  1992). 
Yet  there  is  reason  to  question  whether  the  pursuit  of  policies  that  stimulate  investment  must 
necessarily  enhance  social  well-being.  Suppose  output  is given  at a constant  level.  Consequently, 
an  increase  of  investment  necessarily  involves  the  sacrifice  of  some  goods  or  services  that  could have  been  used  for  current  consumption.  It  is  not  entirely  obvious,  therefore,  that  more 
investment  is  good.  That  is,  the  future  benefits  to  society  from  higher  investment  may  not  be 
sufficient  to justify  the  sacrifice  of  current  consumption. 
For  several  reasons,  however,  I believe  that  under  current  circumstances  in  this  country,  policy 
should  strive  to  increase  private  investment.  The  most  obvious  of  these  is  that  the  economy 
continues  to  operate  below  a  level  consistent  with  the  full  employment  of  its  labor  and  capital 
resources.  To  the  extent  that  higher  investment  spending  increases  the  sales  of  businesses  that 
supply  investment  goods,  these  businesses  will  increase  production  and  employment.  The  incomes 
of  their  workers  will  rise,  causing  an  increase  in  the  demand  for  the  things  that  workers 
buy-thus  stimulating  more  sales,  production,  and  employment  elsewhere  in  the  system.  This 
“ripple  effect”  (what  economists  call  the  “multiplier”)  will  propagate  through  the  economy. 
Therefore,  in  the  current  economic  environment,  the  premise  necessary  to  conclude  that  higher 
investment  requires  a  sacrifice  of  current  consumption  is  false:  Output  is  not  fixed  at  a  “given 
level.”  Higher  investment  will  increase  output  and  employment,  accelerate  economic  growth,  and 
increase  the  prospects  for  more  consumption  as  well. 
A  longer-term  concern  also  supports  the  conclusion  that  the  U.S.  would  benefit  from  higher 
private  investment.  The  1990  report  of  the  Social  Security  Administration  predicts  that  the  ratio 
of  social  security  beneficiaries  to  employed  workers  who  pay  social  security  taxes  will  rise  from 
0.3  in  1990  to  0.5  about  40  years  later  (see  Carlson,  1991,  figure  6).  This  widely  discussed 
change,  caused  by  the  aging  of  the  baby-boom  generation,  will  either  greatly  increase  the  burden 
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retirees.  Much  has  been  written  about  the  need  to  build  up  reserves  in  anticipation  of  this 
potentially  serious  intergenerational  conflict  in  the  next  century.  The  popular  understanding  of 
the  social  security  problem,  however,  is  clouded  by  what  economists  call  a  “fallacy  of 
composition”:  in essence,  incorrectly  concluding  that  what  is true  for  an  individual  applies  to  the 
society  as  a whole.  The  obvious  remedy  for  an  individual  who  wants  to  provide  for  retirement 
is  to  save  while  working  and  then  to  use  accumulated  savings  to  finance  consumption  during 
retirement.  Through  their  personal  saving,  people  see  themselves  as  transferring  resources  from 
the  present  to  the  future-and  from  their  individual  perspective  this  view  is  correct.  But  no  such 
transfer  of  the  actual  goods  that  retirees  want  to consume  occurs  in  the  society  taken  as  a whole. 
Baby-boom  retirees  will  want  to  drive  nice  cars,  eat  good  food,  and  consume  high-quality 
medical  care  that  will  be the  products  of  the  future  economy.  No  one  accumulates  stocks  of  such 
goods  in  massive  warehouses  planning  to  take  them  out  for  use  when  they  retire  in  the  second 
and  third  decades  of  the  next  century!  The  goods  and  services  that  the  baby  boomers  will 
consume  when  they  retire  must  come  from  the  simultaneous  production  of  society. 
The  best  thing,  therefore,  that  we  as  a  society  can  do  today  to  provide  for  the  retirement  of  the 
baby  boomers  is  to  enhance  the  ability  of  the  economy  to  produce  goods  and  services  in  the 
future.  This  objective  requires  higher  investment  now.  With  these  demographic  realities  in  mind, 
the  downward  trend  of  investment  in recent  years  is particularly  discouraging.  Investment  should 
be  rising  as  a  share  of  production.  The  instruments  that  economic  policy  can  employ  to  boost 
investment,  therefore,  form  the  core  of  this  paper. III.  What  Do  We  Know  About  the  Determinants  of  Investment? 
To  understand  how  policy  interacts  with  investment,  we  must  first  consider  how  investment 
decisions  are  made.  With  some  risk  of oversimplification,  the  determinants  of  investment  studied 
in  the  voluminous  academic  literature  on  the  subject  can  be  divided  into  three  broad  categories: 
the  cost  of  capital  (including  interest  rates  and  various  tax  effects),  output  or  sales  variables,  and 
measures  of  firms’  access  to  finance.  I  consider  each  of  these  categories  in  some  detail. 
A.  The  Cost of Capital and  the Neoclassical  Investment Model 
Early  empirical  work  (Meyer  and  Kuh,  1957,  for  example)  emphasized  all  three  categories  of 
investment  determinants.  In  the  1960s  however,  Dale  Jorgenson  developed  what  became  the 
dominant  view  of  investment  in  the  economics  mainstream:  the  neoclassical  investment  model 
(see  Jorgenson,  1971,  for  a survey).  This  theory  is  most  widely  used  to  illustrate  a link  between 
investment  and  interest  rates  or  taxes,  and  this  theory,  therefore,  underlies  most  current  policy 
analyses  of  investment. 
According  to  the  neoclassical  model,  firms  make  employment,  investment,  and  production 
decisions  to  maximize  their  profits  (more  precisely,  the  present  value  of  profits  over  time).  The 
only  constraints  on  firms’  choices  arise  from  market  prices  (which  they  cannot  affect  under 
typical,  perfectly  competitive  assumptions)  and  technology  (which  determines  the  amount  of 
output  the  firm  can  produce  from  its  choice  of  employment  and  capital  inputs).  In  this  theoretical 
8 framework,  then,  investment  is determined  by  technology  and  the  full  spectrum  of  prices.  These 
prices  include  interest  rates  and  other  determinants  of  the  cost  of  capital  such  as  depreciation, 
expected  inflation,  and  aspects  of  the  tax  code  relevant  to  income  from  capital. 
The  direct  role  played  by  policy  in  this  framework  is  clear  but  narrow.  To  the  extent  that 
technology  is  exogenous,  as  most  studies  assume,  policy  impacts  investment  because  policy 
affects  relative  prices.  In  principle,  such  influences  could  occur  through  any  prices  (wages  or 
other  input  prices,  for  example),  but  the  vast  majority  of  work  has  concentrated  on  the  cost  of 
capital.  In  economists’  terms,  this  concept  represents  the  “opportunity  cost”  to  firms’  owners  of 
sinking  money  into  fixed  capital  investment:  the  opportunity  owners  forsake  to  make  an 
investment.  In  a  simple  world  without  taxes  on  capital  income  (an  assumption  we  shall  relax 
momentarily),  the  two  components  of  this  sacrifice  are  reasonably  clear.  Suppose  a  firm  buys  a 
new  machine  tool  for  $100,000  rather  than  paying  out  these  funds  to its  shareholders.  The  owners 
of  equity  will  sacrifice  the  return  they  could  have  received  by  putting  these  funds  into  financial 
assets.  This  opportunity  cost  is  usually  measured  by  the  interest  rate  adjusted  for  risk  and 
anticipated  inflation.  In  addition,  as  the  firm  uses  the  machine  tool  over  the  year,  its  value  is 
likely  to  fall  as  it  wears  out  from  use  and  becomes  technically  obsolete.  Depreciation  and 
obsolescence  are also  part  of  the  sacrifice  the  firm  owners  make  when  the  firm  buys  the  machine. 
Assuming  the  firm  acts  to  maximize  the  wealth  of  its  shareholders,  it will  purchase  the  machine 
only  if  the  new  capital  contributes  enough  to  the  firm’s  profits  to  compensate  shareholders  for 
these  opportunity  costs.  That  is,  the  contribution  of  the  machine  to  profits,  determined  by  the 
firm’s  technology,  must  exceed  the  cost  of  capital.  If  the  inflation-adjusted  interest  rate  is  5 
9 percent  and  the  depreciation  rate  is  10  percent,  a firm  will  buy  a  $100,000  machine  if  it  adds 
$15,000  or  more  to  annual  profits. 
In  this  simple  environment,  policy  effects  are  limited.  Policy  can  do  nothing  about  depreciation 
rates  or  the  productivity  of  capital,  which  are  usually  thought  to  depend  on  the  exogenous 
technology,  However,  policy  may  affect  interest  rates:  If  the  budget  deficit  forces  heavy 
government  borrowing,  real  (inflation-adjusted)  interest  rates  can  rise.3 Therefore,  the  neoclassical 
framework  predicts  that  deficits  hamper  investment.  Monetary  policy  may  also  affect  interest 
rates,  although  there  is widespread  doubt  that  monetary  effects  are  important  over  a long  horizon 
that  should  be  relevant  for  capital  investment. 
This  simple  example,  however,  is only  pedagogical  because  it ignores  the  complex  array  of  taxes 
on  capital  income.  On  the  one  hand,  corporate  profits  generated  by capital  investment  are  subject 
to the  corporate  income  tax.  On the  other  hand,  capital  investment  creates  depreciation  deductions 
that  reduce  corporate  taxes:  For  most  of  the  period  from  1962  until  the  Tax  Reform  Act  of  1986, 
investment  further  reduced  corporate  taxes  through  a  special  subsidy  called  the  investment  tax 
credit.  In  addition,  nominal  interest  payments  made  by  firms  that  finance  their  investment  with 
debt  are  deductible,  but  the  dividends  paid  to  shareholders  who  provide  equity  finance  for 
investment  cannot  be  deducted.  Even  personal  taxes  can  have  an  impact  on  the  cost  of  capital 
if  managers  act  in  the  interest  of  their  tax-paying  shareholders.  For  example,  the  literature  has 
placed  much  emphasis  on  the  differential  tax  treatment  of  capital  gains  and  dividends.“ 
10 These  complexities  can  be  integrated  into  the  cost  of  capital5  The  simple  investment  theory 
presented  above  is  modified  to predict  that  firms  will  invest  in  a new  factory  or  machinery  if  the 
value  of  such  a project  exceeds  the  after-tax  cost  of  capital.  These  tax  effects  introduce  another 
lever  for  policy  to  affect  investment.  Changes  in depreciation  allowances  or  the  personal  taxation 
of  capital  gains,  to  name  two  examples  that  are  widely  discussed  currently,  change  the  cost  of 
capital  and  potentially  affect  investment. 
This  discussion  of  the  neoclassical  investment  model  (and  its  policy  implications)  summarizes 
a theory.  While  the  theory  is  logically  coherent,  it  is based  on  liberal  assumptions.  For  example, 
most  versions  assume  that  firms  can  purchase  all  the  inputs  and  sell  all  the  output  they  want  to 
at  given  prices  (firms  operate  in  “perfectly  competitive”  markets).  In  addition,  if  firms  do  not 
have  sufficient  funds  to  finance  a  desirable  investment  project  themselves,  the  model  assumes 
that  they  can  obtain  all  the  resources  they  need  externally  by  issuing  new  shares  at  a fair  market 
price  or  by  borrowing  at  an  economy-wide  interest  rate.  There  is  little  doubt  that  these  strong 
assumptions  are  violated  to  some  degree  in  reality.  The  more  important  question  for  policy 
analysis,  however,  is  whether  a  theory  based  on  these  assumptions  nevertheless  adequately 
describes  the  most  important  aspects  of  the  way  firms  make  investment  decisions.  This  question 
must  be  answered  by  empirical  tests  of  the  theory. 
Tests  of  the  neoclassical  theory  immediately  encounter  an  important  problem  in  their  attempt  to 
evaluate  the  impact  of  interest  rates  on  investment.  The  most  widely  used  empirical  model  based 
on  the  theory  links  the  cost  of  capital  effect  with  variables  that  measure  firms’  output  or  sales 
11 performance.  Some  of  these  models  explain  investment  very  well,  but  it is difficult  to disentangle 
the  explanatory  power  of  interest  rates  from  sales6  Thus,  there  is  uncertainty  about  the  extent  to 
which  policy  influences  investment  through  the  cost  of  capital  and  interest  rates.  Section  IV  of 
this  paper  presents  new  empirical  research  aimed  at resolving  some  of  this  uncertainty. 
B.  Sales  and  the Accelerator 
In  most  versions  of  the  neoclassical  model,  firms  choose  how  much  output  they  want  to produce 
under  the  assumption  that  they  can  sell  all  they  want  to  at  the  given  market  price.  The  only 
limitations  firms  perceive  on  their  production  arise  from  their  technology  and  market  prices.  This 
“perfectly  competitive”  environment,  however,  does  not  adequately  describe  the  circumstances 
of  firms  in  most  U.S.  industries.  Typically,  firms  have  at  least  some  control  over  the  price  they 
charge,  and  the  sales  they  can  make  at  a given  price  are  limited  by  the  strength  of  demand  for 
their  products.  In  these  conditions,  one  would  expect  that  firms’  expectations  of  future  sales 
would  have  an  important  impact  on  their  investment  spending.  High  sales  growth,  currently  and 
in  the  recent  past,  will  likely  cause  expectations  of  higher  sales  in  the  future  and  will  give  firms 
the  incentive  to  invest  in  new  productive  capacity.  Low  sales  growth  will  reduce  the  incentives 
to  invest.  This  intuition  underlies  one  of  the  oldest  and  most  empirically  successful  investment 
models  (going  back  at  least  to  Clark,  1917):  the  accelerator.  In  its  simplest  form,  the  accelerator 
theory  predicts  that  if  a firm’s  sales  growth  increases,  its  investment  will  concurrently  rise. 
Various  versions  of  the  accelerator  have  been  used  in  empirical  investment  studies  for  decades 
12 with  excellent  results.  As  mentioned  previously,  strong  accelerator  effects  have  clouded  the 
empirical  evaluation  of  the  neoclassical  model  because  many  versions  of  the  neoclassical 
approach  allow  the  cost  of  capital  to  affect  investment  only  through  variables  that  also  include 
sales  or  output.  Therefore,  one  often  cannot  determine  the  separate  impact  of  sales  and  the  cost 
of  capital  from  this  research,  and  it  is  difficult  to  evaluate  the  independent  importance  of  these 
channels  for  policy  analysis. 
Some  studies,  however,  have  compared  the  separate  effects  of  sales  and  the  cost  of  capital  for 
explaining  investment.  In  a  recent  survey,  Robert  Chirinko  (1991,  p.  14)  writes,  “although 
empirical  results  with  versions  of the  neoclassical  model  differ  widely,  they  suggest  to  this  author 
that  output  (or  sales)  is  clearly  the  dominant  determinant  of  investment  spending  with  the  [cost 
of  capital]  having  a  modest  effect.”  Therefore,  there  is  doubt  about  the  important  implicit 
assumption,  largely  unquestioned  in  policy  circles,  that  changes  in  the  cost  of  capital  of  the 
magnitude  likely  to arise  from  deficits  or tax reform  will  have  an important  effect  on  investment. 
[New  empirical  evidence  to  address  this  problem  is  presented  in  Section  IV.] 
If  sales  dominate  the  cost  of  capital  as  a determinant  of  investment,  and  if  sales  are  determined 
in  part  by  the  general  health  of  the  economy,  then  the  links  between  fiscal  policy  and  capital 
spending  are  significantly  different  from  the  policy  implications  of  the  orthodox  model 
summarized  previously.  The  indirect  effects  of  the  tax  system  on  investment,  working  through 
the  influence  of  taxation  on  aggregate  spending  and  firms’  sales,  may  dominate  the  direct  effects 
of  taxes  on  the  cost  of  capital.  In  other  words,  the  damage  done  to  the  economy  through  deficit 
13 reduction  may  be  greater  than  the  economic  benefits  accrued  via  lower  interest  rates. 
For  example,  compare  the  impact  of  a capital  gains  tax  cut  with  an  across-the-board  tax  cut  of 
the  variety  often  put  forward  as  “middle-class  tax  relief.”  Cuts  in  the  capital  gains  tax  rate  may 
reduce  the  cost  of  capital  required  by  firms’  shareholders,  since  the  tax  bite  will  be  smaller  on 
the  appreciation  in firm  value  that  results  from  investment.  But,  as indicated  above,  the  empirical 
effect  of  the  cost  of  capital  on  investment  may  be  small.  Moreover,  the  impact  of  cutting  capital 
gains  taxes  on  aggregate  spending  will  likely  be  minimal.  As  is  widely  discussed,  most  capital 
gains  income  accrues  to relatively  wealthy  individuals,  whose  consumption  spending  is not  likely 
to  change  much  as the  result  of  marginally  lower  taxes.  In  contrast,  a middle-class  tax  cut,  while 
it has  little  direct  influence  on  the  cost  of  capital,  may  stimulate  consumer  spending  and  increase 
firms’  sales,  thus  improving  the  investment  climate  through  the  accelerator  effect.  This  channel 
of  influence  could  well  be  more  important  empirically  than  the  cost  of  capital  effect,  which 
receives  much  more  attention  in  policy  debates. 
Similar  arguments  can  be  made  about  the  impact  of  government  spending  and  the  federal  budget 
deficit.  Theoretically,  deficit  spending  hurts  investment  through  the  cost-of-capital  channel  as 
government  borrowing  increases  interest  rates  and  “crowds-out”  private  investment.  But,  again, 
this  effect  may  be weak  empirically.  Deficit  spending  also  stimulates  demand  and  sales,  however, 
leading  to more  investment  through  the  accelerator  effect,  which  is strong  empirically.  Therefore, 
it  is  not  clear  that  a  public  capital  accumulation  program  designed  to  improve  education  and 
national  infrastructure,  for  example,  will  crowd-out  private  investment,  even  if  it is  financed  by 
14 an  increase  in  the  deficit.  Through  the  accelerator  effect,  such  a policy  may  lead  to  rn~~e private 
investment.7  These  observations  suggest  the  need  to  evaluate  the  empirical  strength  of  the 
cost-of-capital  channel  versus  the  accelerator  channel  in the  determination  of investment,  an issue 
examined  in  detail  later  in  this  paper. 
Many  economists  would  qualify  this  discussion  in  an important  way.  Some  allege  that  the  effects 
of  the  accelerator,  though  empirically  strong,  are  widely  viewed  as  temporary,  applying  to 
transient  circumstances  when  the  economy  operates  below  full  employment  of  its  labor  and 
capital  resources.  In  contrast,  the  cost-of-capital  effects,  although  they  are  weaker  empirically, 
are  permanent  in  neoclassical  theory,  and  they  affect  the  desired  stock  of  capital  even  at  full 
employment.  Some  would  argue,  therefore,  that  policies  designed  to  insure  the  long-run  health 
of  the  economy  should  emphasize  the  cost-of-capital  channel. 
There  are  several  important  reasons,  however,  why  such  a  focus  could  mislead  policy  design. 
Presently,  the  economy  continues  to  suffer  in  an extended  period  during  which  capital  and  labor 
resources  are  vastly  underutilized.  The  sacrifice  imposed  by  the  slack  economy  on  material 
standards  of  living  and,  perhaps  more  important,  the  national  sense  of  well-being,  has  been 
substantial,  An  important  objective  of  investment  policy  over  the  short  to  medium  horizon  must 
be  to  invigorate  the  economy  by  creating  jobs,  improving  productivity,  and  increasing  incomes. 
There  is  little  doubt  that  the  accelerator  effect  is  much  more  important  than  the  cost  of  capital 
in  this  area.  More  specifically,  the  economy’s  interest  may  be  much  better  served  by  a tax  policy 
that  gives  a strong  and  reliable  boost  to investment  over  a three-  to  five-year  horizon  (the  typical 
15 operative  period  for  the  accelerator)  than  a policy  that  may  have  a more  persistent  effect,  but  one 
that  is  weaker  and  less  certain  (through  the  cost  of  capital). 
The  argument  for  greater  emphasis  on  the  accelerator  may  go  even  deeper  because  it is  not  clear 
that  its  effects  are  necessarily  short  term.  The  view  that  the  investment  stimulus  through  the 
accelerator  is  temporary  relies  on  the  assumption  that  the  economy  will  eventually  converge  to 
a  full  employment  equilibrium  as  a  result  of  its  own  natural  adjustment  mechanisms. 
Furthermore,  the  output  and  employment  forthcoming  in  this  long-run  equilibrium  are  assumed 
to  be  largely  independent  of  how  the  economy  has  performed  in  the  recent  past.  There  are  good 
reasons  to  question  both  of  these  critical  assumptions. 
The  natural  stabilizing  forces  in the  economy  that  are usually  assumed  to restore  full  employment 
can  be  quite  weak,  and  they  may  be  dwarfed  by  destabilizing  channels.8  If  this  is  the  case, 
investment  stimulus  through  the  accelerator  could  have  a  prolonged  effect  by  pushing  the 
economy  toward  full  employment  when  it  otherwise  may  have  continued  to  stagnate.  If 
policymakers  ignore  the  need  for  explicit  stabilization  policy,  benignly  relying  on  the  weak 
stabilizing  forces  of  the  market  alone  to  overcome  stagnation,  recovery  may  be  long  delayed  or 
may  not  occur  at all.  Indeed,  this  perspective  is consistent  with  current  concerns  about  the  anemic 
pace  of  economic  recovery  in the  United  States.  During  the  recession  (and  even  thereafter),  many 
forecasters  discouraged  the  use  of  a fiscal  stimulus  to fight  slow-growth  problems  because  of  the 
deficit.  After  a prolonged  period  of disappointing  economic  performance,  the  group  of “economic 
advisers  still  sticking  to  the  ‘just  wait,  things  are  about  to  get  better’  school  is  shrinking” 
(Wessel,  1992,  p.  1). 
16 In  addition,  even  if  the  economy  would  get  to  a  long-run,  full-employment  equilibrium  on  its 
own,  the  short-run  performance  of  the  system  may  impact  the  character  of  its  long-run 
equilibrium.  Such  effects  arise  because  short-run  performance  affects  the  extent  of  technical 
progress  (which  is  also  tied  to  the  level  of  investment)  and  the  productivity  of  labor.  As  Frank 
Hahn  recently  wrote,  “We  do  not  have  to  settle  for  the  historical  determinism  entailed  by  unique 
steady  state  growth  rates”  (1990,  p.  35).  Furthermore,  in  an  open  economy,  weak,  short-run 
investment  of  a  domestic  industry  vis-‘a-vis  its  foreign  competitors  could  cripple  the  industry 
permanently.’  We  must  not,  therefore,  discount  the  importance  of  “short-term”  fluctuations  of 
investment  or  employment  under  the  misguided  assumption  that  all  will  be  well  in  some 
unchanging,  long-run,  steady  state,  the  character  of  which  is  independent  of  shorter-term 
problems  suffered  by  the  economy.  Short-run  macroeconomic  weakness  can  have  long-run 
consequences. 
C.  Finance  and  Investment 
Recent  research  developments  on  the  link  between  financial  markets  and  investment  also  suggest 
a  need  to  reexamine  the  economic  foundations  of  investment  policy  debates.  Much  of  the 
mainstream  empirical  research  on  investment  is  based  on  the  assumption  that  firms  can  obtain 
financing  for  any  investment  project  they  believe  is profitable  (when  the  project  is  evaluated  at 
a cost  of  capital  based  on  market  interest  rates).  New  theoretical  and  empirical  research,  however, 
has  made  important  advances  in  studying  what  are  often  called  “finance  constraints.”  The  idea 
that  the  access  to finance  may  limit  investment-independent  of  traditional  determinants  such  as 
17 interest  rates,  taxes,  and  technology-now  has  wide  (though  not  universal)  support  among 
Suppose  a firm  does  not  have  sufficient  internal  cash  to undertake  a desirable  investment  project. 
It  must  then  seek  funds  from  external  sources:  either  new  borrowing  or  stock  issues.  External 
finance,  however,  may  be  more  costly  than  internal  funds  for  a  variety  of  reasons.  It  is  even 
possible  that  some  firms  will  not  have  access  to  any  external  funds. 
Undoubtedly,  there  are  transactions  costs  associated  with  external  finance  because  of  firms’  need 
to  work  with  financial  intermediaries  that  must  cover  their  own  costs  and  make  a profit  on  the 
deal.  Estimates  suggest  these  costs  can  be  quite  substantial  (see  the  papers  cited  by  Fazzari, 
Hubbard,  and  Petersen,  1988,  pp.  148-154).  Therefore,  an  investment  project  that  would  be 
undertaken  when  the  firm  has  sufficient  internal  cash  to  finance  it  may  be  postponed,  or  not 
undertaken  at  all,  if  the  firm  must  rely  on  more  costly  external  funds. 
Recent  literature  has  emphasized  deeper  reasons  financial  constraints  on  investment  may  arise. 
Many  of  the  problems  center  on  different  (“asymmetric”)  information  available  to  borrowers  and 
lenders  that  can  lead  to  many  nontraditional  results.  For  example,  credit  may  be  “rationed,” 
meaning  that  interest  rates  do  not  equate  the  supply  and  demand  for  loans,  leaving  some  firms 
without  finance  and  constraining  their  investment.  Furthermore,  the  ability  of  a firm  to undertake 
an  investment  project  may  depend  not  only  on  the  economic  fundamentals  of  the  project  under 
consideration,  but  also  on  the  firm’s  financial  condition.  Again,  the  same  project  in  which  a firm 
18 would  invest  if  it  had  sufficient  internal  funds  might  not  be  undertaken  if  the  firm  had  to  raise 
external  funds  to  finance  the  project. 
This  research  program  has  also  spawned  new  empirical  work  examining  the  importance  of 
finance.  The  results  strongly  support  the  idea  that  the  financial  condition  of  fiis  matters.  In 
particular,  recent  work  has  demonstrated  the  link  between  investment  and  internal  cash  flow, 
variations  in  which  are  determined  largely  by  profits.  This  connection  is  most  important  for 
relatively  small,  fast-growing  firms  that  are  likely  concentrated  in  the  most  dynamic  sectors  of 
the  U.S.  economy.  The  evidence  implies  that  such  firms  face  the  most  severe  information 
problems.  But  presumably  these  firms  are  the  most  important  in  enhancing  U.S.  growth  and 
international  competitiveness,  and  therefore  deserve  special  attention  in  the  policy  discussion. 
Finance  constraints  also  set  up  another  channel  through  which  accelerator  effects  operate. 
Fluctuations  of  internal  finance  are  driven  by  fluctuations  of  profits,  which  move  strongly  in 
accordance  with  the  business  cycle.”  Therefore,  recessions  have  an  indirect  but  important  effect 
on  investment  because  they  hamper  firms’  ability  to finance  investment  from  internal  profits.  The 
financial  problems  that  often  arise  in recessions  also  probably  raise  the  cost  and  limit  the  amount 
of  external  credit  that  firms  can  obtain.  The  recent  “credit  squeeze”  is  a case  in  point.12 These 
observations  imply  again  that  the  impact  of  fiscal  policy  on  the  course  of  the  business  cycle  may 
be  a much  more  important  channel  of influence  for  investment  than  effects  that  work  through  the 
cost  of  capital.13 
19 Financial  effects  on  investment  interact  with  the  business  cycle  in another  more  subtle  way.  Profit 
(or  cash  flow  more  broadly)  is  not  the  only  source  of  internal  finance  for  investment.  Firms  can 
also  finance  capital  spending  by  reducing  the  amount  of  other  assets  they  hold.  For  example,  if 
firms  face  a downturn  in  cash  flow  but  want  to  maintain  investment  spending  without  resorting 
to  new  borrowing  or  stock  issues,  they  can  sell  off  (or  simply  not  replace)  inventories,  reduce 
their  cash  holdings,  or  tighten  their  policies  on  collecting  accounts  receivable.  The  funds  released 
by  these  reductions  in  liquid  assets  can  be  used  to  temporarily  “smooth”  a  firm’s  investment 
spending.  l4 
The  extent  to  which  this  kind  of  behavior  can  occur  depends  on  the  liquidity  of  firms.  Firms’ 
ability  to  cushion  investment  against  downturns  in  cash  flow  will  be  impaired  if  they  hold  fewer 
liquid  assets  or  are  more  heavily  indebted  going  into  the  recession.  Again,  this  point  is 
particularly  relevant  to  current  conditions.  Coming  into  the  early  199Os, U.S.  corporations  had 
lower  inventory  stocks  and  much  higher  debt  than  in recent  history.  This  low  liquidity  may  have 
magnified  the  shortfall  of  investment  in  the  recent  slow  growth  and  recession  period.  The 
metamorphosis  of  financial  circumstances,  therefore,  increases  the  importance  of  macroeconomic 
fluctuations  for  investment,  and  it correspondingly  magnifies  the  role  of  policies  that  both  create 
and  contain  the  business  cycle. 
20 IV.  Empirical  Evidence  on  the  Determinants  of  Investment 
A. Motivation  and Data 
The  theoretical  analysis  summarized  in  the  previous  section  identifies  a  number  of  channels 
through  which  policy  may  impact  investment.  Many  of  the  papers  cited  above  provide  empirical 
evidence  that  can  be  used  to  sort  through  the  relative  size  of  the  various  channels,  and  thus  to 
provide  a quantitative  basis  for  policy  proposals.  But  this  evidence  tends  to  be  fragmented  and 
results  are  often  inconclusive  or  contradictory. 
Moreover,  even  though  the  analysis  of  investment  determinants  is  fundamentally  a 
microeconomic  issue,  relevant  to  the  behavior  of  individual  firms,  most  of  the  empirical  studies 
on  these  issues  are  undertaken  using  aggregate  data,  often  under  the  assumption  that  the  entire 
economy  behaves  “as  if’  it could  be  described  by  a single  “representative  firm.”  Obviously,  this 
approach  precludes  any  evidence  to support  the  view  that  heterogeneity  among  firms  is important 
for  policy  purposes.  While  some  studies  do  analyze  firm-level  data,  they  usually  do  not  cover 
enough  of  the  economy  to  support  strong  conclusions  for  macroeconomic  policy. 
For  these  reasons,  this  section  presents  new  empirical  evidence  on  the  determinants  of 
investment.  The  primary  innovation  in  the  approach  taken  here  is in  the  data  analyzed.  The  data 
sample  is  constructed  from  the  “full  coverage”  files  of  the  Standard  and  Poor’s  COMPUSTAT 
database.  It  provides  information  for  over  5,000  U.S.  manufacturing  firms  from  1971  to  1990 
21 (about  53,000  observations).  Over  this  period,  the  total  capital  spending  by  these  firms  accounts 
for  42  percent  of  total  U.S.  fixed  capital  investment.15  Therefore,  these  data  capture  a large  part 
of  the  economy.  The  extent  of  macrocoverage  provided  by  this  sample  is,  to  the  author’s 
knowledge,  greater  than  any  previous  study  of  U.S.  investment  with  firm-level  data.  More  will 
be  said  later  about  how  to  generalize  the  results  to  the  rest  of  the  economy. 
To  measure  the  sensitivity  of  investment  to  the  major  determinants  discussed  previously,  the 
investment  regression  equation  includes  three  sets  of  variables:  sales  growth,  firms’  internal  cash 
flow,  and  the  percentage  change  of  the  cost  of  capital.  The  sales  growth  variables  are  suggested 
by  the  accelerator  theory.  16The  effect  of  internal  cash  flow  represents  the  importance  of  finance 
constraints:  When  firms  have  higher  cash  flow,  they  will  have  greater  control  over  their 
investment  spending  because  they  depend  less  on  external  funds  (new  debt  or  stock  issues)  that 
may  be  excessively  costly,  or  even  impossible  to  obtain.  l7  The  percentage  change  in  the  financial 
cost  of  capital,  which  includes  interest  rates  and  tax  adjustments,  reflects  the  conventional 
channels  for  policy  influence  on  investment. 
The  regression  equations  presented  here  are called  “reduced  forms”  in the  research  literature.  That 
is, they  simply  relate  the  dependent  variable,  firm  investment  in this  case,  to various  determinants 
suggested  by theory  without  imposing  any  particular  structure  on  the  empirical  relationship.‘*This 
approach  has  been  criticized  for  purposes  of  policy  analysis  because  new  policies  may  change 
the  empirical  parameters  estimated  from  data  generated  under  the  old  policies  (this  problem  is 
called  the  “Lucas  critique”  in  the  literature,  after  Robert  Lucas  whose  work  emphasized  these 
22 issues).  After  obtaining  results  and  considering  their  significance  for  policy,  it is vital  to consider 
how  proposed  policy  changes  might  affect  the  economic  structure  that  generates  the  empirical 
results.” 
B.  Firm  Heterogeneity 
To  address  the  possibility  that  the  importance  of  various  determinants  of  investment  will  likely 
differ  across  firms,  I have  divided  the  sample  into  groups  based  on  each  firm’s  average  real  sales 
growth.  This  is only  one  of  a number  of interesting  sample  splits,  but  it is particularly  appropriate 
for  the  purposes  of  this  research.  The  interest  is  in  the  effects  of  fiscal  policies  on  investment 
across  firms  with  different  potential  to  contribute  to  the  long-run  growth  of  productivity, 
employment,  and  international  competitiveness.  Sales  growth  captures  these  characteristics. 
Fast-growing  firms  are  the  ones  that  have  been  successful  at  producing  for  changing  markets. 
These  firms  are  most  likely  to  be  hiring  new  workers  in  the  greatest  numbers,  and  they  are  also 
most  likely  to  develop  and  adopt  new  technologies. 
The  sample  is  split  into  four  groups.  The  details  of  the  sales-growth  classification  are  given  in 
Appendix  A.  Inflation-adjusted  sales  of  the  negative-growth  firms  contracted,  on  average,  by  1 
percent  or  more  over  the  sample  period.  Table  1 shows  that  these  firms  accounted  for  almost  18 
percent  of  the  observations,  but  under  4 percent  of  the  total  investment.  Average  real  sales  for 
zero-growth  firms  grew  between  negative  1  percent  and  positive  2  percent.  The  highest 
proportion  of  the  observations,  the  majority  of  investment,  and  the  biggest  firms  fell  into  the 
23 moderate-growth  class.  These  firms  had  real  sales  growth  rates  that  averaged  between  2  and  7 
percent.  The  high-growth  firms,  with  average  growth  rates  above  7 percent  were  expanding  very 
fast  indeed  (average  sales  growth  of  nearly  16 percent). 
24 Variable 
Range  of  Average 
Sales  Growth  Included 
Percent  of 
Observations  17.6%  22.5%  39.9%  20.0% 
Table  1 
Characteristics  of  Sample  Firms  by  Sales-Growth  Class 









Relow  -1%  -1%  to  +2%  +2%  to  +7%  Above  +7% 
Percent  of 
Investment  3.4%  18.4%  66.4%  11.8% 
Average  Capital 
(1982  dollars,  in  millions)  $160  $491  $986  $245 
Average  Sales  Growth  - 5.4%  +  1.1%  +  5.6%  +  15.9% 
High-Tech  Percentage  36.3%  40.8%  45.5%  64.8% 
Average  Stock 
Price  Growth  9.0%  9.2%  9.5%  11.6% 
Average  Employment 
Growth  0.6%  0.9%  4.5%  12.5% 
Investment  to 
Capital  Ratio  0.117  0.153  0.196  0.319 
R&D  Spending  to 
Capital  Ratio  0.091  0.087  0.124  0.264 
Share  of  R&D  in 
Capital  Spending  27.4%  25.0%  29.1%  37.0% 
Source:  Author’s  calculations  from  COMPUSTAT  manufacturing  firm  database.  See  Appendix  A  for  further  details. 
25 Table  1 also  provides  statistics  that  highlight  further  differences  between  these  groups  of  firms. 
Not  only  are  the  high-sales-growth  firms  expanding  more  quickly,  they  are  more  concentrated 
in  high-technology  industies.20  The  higher-growth  classes  provided  much  more  employment 
growth  over  the  sample  period  and  their  gross  investment  rate  (plant  and  equipment  spending 
divided  by  the  capital  stock)  was  much  higher.  The  stock  market  value  of  firms  in  the  highest 
growth  class  rose  more  quickly  than  for  the  other  firms.  Finally,  research  and  development 
spending  was  much  higher  for  the  faster-growing  classes.  Together  these  statistics  show  that  the 
moderate-growth  firms  and  especially  the  high-growth  firms  represent  the  most  progressive 
sectors  of  the  U.S.  economy.  For  this  reason,  their  investment  is  likely  crucial  for  productivity 
growth  and  international  competitiveness. 
C.  Regression  Results 
[An  econometric  discussion  of  the  specification  used,  the  lag  pattern,  and  standard  errors  is 
presented  in  Appendix  A.  For  summary  results  of  the  investment  regressions,  see  Table  3  in 
Appendix  B .] 
The  impact  of  changing  capital  costs,  which  include  interest  rates,  however,  is much  less  certain. 
The  evidence  suggests  that  higher  real  rates  cause  investment  to  fall  only  for  the  negative-  and 
slow-growth  firms.  The  estimated  effects  for  the  moderate-  and  fast-growth  classes,  which 
undertake  over  three-quarters  of  the  investment  in  the  sample,  actually  go  the  wrong  direction. 
The  pre-  and  after-tax  regressions  were  also  run  with  alternative  interest  rates,  including  yields 
26 on  Treasury  securities  of  different  maturities.  The  results  did  not  change  materially.  The  results 
presented  in  Table  3  are  from  the  regressions  that  predicted  the  largest  negative  effects  of 
changes  in  capital  costs.  Appendix  A  contains  more  details  about  these  tests. 
One  possible  reason  that  I  fail  to  find  negative  effects  of  changing  interest  rates  for  growing 
firms  is  that  the  regressions  use  rates  determined  in  centralized  securities  markets  (the  Baa 
corporate  bond  yield  adjusted  for  inflation  and  corporate  taxes,  for  the  results  in  Table  3).  The 
interest  rates  that  individual  firms  face  may  well  vary  substantially  from  such  centralized  rates. 
While  this  point  is  of  interest  for  economic  theory,  it  is  not  particularly  important  for  policy 
purposes.  If policy  affects  investment  through  interest  rates,  it certainly  works  through  the  interest 
rates  set  by  the  centralized  securities  markets  (these  centralized  rates  may  then,  in  turn,  drive 
firm-specific  borrowing  rates).  If  the  deficit,  for  example,  raises  real  interest  rates  and 
crowds-out  a substantial  amount  of  private  investment,  then  we  should  detect  a negative  impact 
of  government  bond  rates  on  investment  spending.  If  this  effect  does  not  ultimately  affect  the 
investment  of  growing  firms  in  this  sample  it  is  hard  to  see  how  it  could  be  important  for 
aggregate  investment. 
Furthermore,  it is unlikely  that  the  firms  that  are  not  included  in the  sample  will  be  more  affected 
by  aggregate  variables  than  the  sample  firms.  While  the  sample  is  extensive  and  contains  much 
heterogeneity,  the  U.S.  firms  not  included  in  the  sample  are  certainly  smaller  on  average,  and 
probably  have  less  access  to  centralized  credit  markets.  Therefore,  if  any  policy-induced  effects 
of  market  interest  rates  or  tax  parameters  on  investment  exist,  they  should  show  up  in  this 
sample. 
27 Let  us put  these  results  into  a more  relevant  perspective.  How  might  they  be  used  to  evaluate  the 
impact  of  the  recently  passed  .Budget  Reconciliation  Act  of  1993?  Many  private  forecasters 
predict  that  the  combination  of  spending  cuts  and  tax increases  will  reduce  economic  growth  over 
a  short  to  moderate  horizon.21  If  total  spending  falls  just  as  much  as  the  projected  deficit  is 
reduced  (that  is,  there  are  no  “multiplier”  effects),  growth  will  be  about  0.3  percentage  points 
lower  over  the  next  five  years.  Suppose  that  each  percentage  point  reduction  in economic  growth 
reduces  cash  flow  by  a  conservatively  small  1.5 percentage  points.22  These  factors  will  reduce 
investment  through  the  strong  channels  discussed  above.  The  predicted  impact  of  these  changes 
on  the  investment-capital  ratio  are  given  in  the  first  two  columns  of  Table  3  for  each 
sales-growth  class.  Note  especially  the  substantial  difference  in  the  determinants  of  investment 
across  firms  with  different  growth  characteristics.  The  depressing  effect  of  lower  cash  flow  is 
over  13 times  more  important  for  the  high-growth  firms  than  it  is  for  the  contracting  class.  The 
importance  of  heterogeneity  in  firm  characteristics  is  clear  in  these  results  and  such  differences 
must  not  be  ignored  in  policy  discussions. 
28 Table  2 
Estimated  Change  in  Investment  Due  to  Budget  Reconciliation  Act  of  1993 
(Cumulative  Results:  1994-1998) 
Percentage  Point  Change  in  the 
Investment-Capital  Ratio  due  to  Changes  in: 
Growth  Sales 







Percent  of 
Investment 
Negative  -0.28  -0.09  +0.34  -0.03  -0.26% 
Zero  -0.32  -0.30  +0.34  -0.28  -1.83% 
Moderate  -0.50  -0.53  +0.34  -0.69  -3.52% 
High  -0.54  -1.19  +0.34  -1.39  -4.36% 
Source:  Author’s  calculations  from  a  simulation  based  on  the  assumptions  described  in  the  text  and  the  estimated  investment  model  presented 
in  Appendix  A. 
What effects  of deficit  reduction  offset the drag on investment  resulting  from a weaker  economy? 
The conventional  wisdom is that lower interest rates will boost capital  spending,  helping  to justify 
the sacrifices  necessary  to achieve  deficit  reduction.  Indeed,  as it became  likely  that  Bill  Clinton 
would  win  the  election  in  the  fall  of  1992, long-term  interest  rates  began  to  fall.  This  trend 
continued  through  the ultimate  passage of the deficit  reduction  bill. As of August  12, 1993 (after 
President  Clinton  signed  the  bill),  the  yields  on  long-term  corporate  bond  rates  had  fallen  an 
average  of  1.13 percentage  points  from  their  peaks  during  the previous  year.23 
Although  long-term  interest  rates  should  largely  adjust  to  account  for  the  impact  of  deficit 
reduction  as the  policy  is announced  and enacted,  to be conservative  I assumed  that  long  rates 
29 will  continue  to  fall  by  another  1.13  percentage  points  as  deficit  reduction  is  implemented  over 
the  next  five  years.  Furthermore,  also  to  be  conservative,  I assumed  that  the  interest  rate  effects 
on  investment  for  all classes offirms  would  be  the  same  as  those  estimated  for  the  contracting 
class  even  though  the  estimated  model  implies  that  these  effects  for  growing  firms  were  actually 
weaker  (or  went  the  wrong  direction)  in  the  data.  This  assumption  implies  that  the  interest  rate 
effect  assumed  in  Table  3  is  the  most  favorable  of  all  my  estimates  to  the  view  that  deficit 
reduction  will  help  investment. 
The  cumulative  impact  of these  conservatively  large  interest  rate  changes  on  investment,  for  1994 
through  1998,  appears  in the  third  column  of Table  2. For  the  negative-growth  firms,  the  stimulus 
to investment  due  to  lower  interest  rates  almost  offsets  the  depressing  effects  of  lower  cash  flow 
and  reduced  sales  growth.  But  for  all  the  other  classes  of  firms,  which  undertake  the  vast 
majority  of  investment  in  the  sample,  the  depressing  effects  of  deficit  reduction  through  weaker 
sales  growth  and  cash  flow  dominate  any  stimulus  due  to  lower  interest  rates.24 
These  calculations  are only  illustrative.  Predicting  the  impact  of deficit  reduction  on  sales  growth, 
cash  flow,  and  interest  rates  is  a  very  complicated  problem.  Changes  in  the  economic 
environment  might  affect  the  relationship  between  investment  and  its determinants  relative  to  the 
period  from  which  the  data  were  drawn  (as  suggested  by  the  Lucas  critique  discussed  above). 
There  may  also  be  complex  feedbacks  between  investment,  sales,  cash  flow,  and  interest  rates 
in  the  macroeconomic  system.  A  complete  analysis  of  these  issues  is  beyond  the  scope  of  this 
paper.  Nevertheless,  the  results  in  Table  3 show  that  the  pursuit  of  deficit  reduction  in  the  hope 
30 of  an  interest  rate-driven  boom  in  capital  spending  over  the  next  several  years  is a risky  gamble. 
I  now  turn  to  a  more  detailed  discussion  of  the  implications  of  these  results  for  fiscal  policy 
debates. 
V.  Fiscal  Policy  and  Investment 
The  research  summarized  in  the  previous  section  shows  that  the  strength  of  the  economy  and 
firms’  access  to  finance  strongly  affect  the  path  of  fixed  investment  in  the  United  States.  In 
contrast,  the  impact  of  changes  in  the  cost  of  capital,  including  interest  rates  and  tax  incentives, 
is decidedly  weaker,  especially  for  fast-growing  firms.  What  can  we  learn  from  these  results  that 
will  help  guide  government  fiscal  policy  in  the  coming  years ?  I emphasize  three  broad  lessons: 
(1) the  importance  for  investment  of maintaining  healthy  economic  growth,  (2) the  likelihood  that 
reduced  government  deficits  will  not  stimulate  private  investment  to  a  substantial  extent, 
especially  in  the  current  economic  environment,  and  (3)  the  need  for  “robust”  policies  to  boost 
investment  that  will  be  effective  through  channels  other  than  lowering  the  cost  of  capital. 
It  is  very  clear  that  the  path  of  investment  is  the  path  of  the  business  cycle.  Investment  will  be 
strong  when  firms  perceive  growing  markets  for  their  goods.  A  strong  aggregate  economy  also 
supports  profits  and  improves  firms’  ability  to  tinance  capital  spending  without  relying  on 
external  funds.  The  empirical  evidence  summarized  above  provides  compelling  evidence  about 
the  importance  of  these  channels  of  influence  on  investment.  If  the  economy  stagnates  because 
31 the  Federal  Reserve  squeezes  the  economy  in its  zeal  to reach  zero  inflation  or because  Congress 
and  the  president  cut  spending  and  increase  taxes  in  ways  that  lower  sales  and  profit  growth,  one 
of  the  costs  will  be  lower  investment. 
Moreover,  these  costs  are  not  necessarily  temporary.  Capital,  by  its  nature,  is  durable  and  takes 
time  to  build  and  install.  Downturns  of  investment  induced  by  macroeconomic  stagnation  may 
keep  the  capital  stock  below  its  long-run  trend  for  many  years,  and  the  trend  itself  may  be 
affected  if  economic  weakness  today  reduces  the  rate  of  technical  innovation. 
A  realistic  assessment  of  the  determinants  of  investment  also  leads  to  a  second  lesson  that 
changes  the  terms  of  what  has  become  the  dominant  concern  in  post-Reagan  fiscal  policy:  the 
huge  and  persistent  federal  budget  deficit.  In  the  minds  of  many  analysts  and  policymakers,  the 
chief  problem  with  the  deficit  is  that  government  borrowing  “crowds-out”  private  capital 
investment,  with  obvious  negative  consequences  for  the  economy.  How  might  this  happen? 
Government  borrowing  raises  market  interest  rates,  supposedly  discouraging  private  capital 
spending.  An  often-cited  rationale  for  deficit  reduction,  therefore,  is that  lowering  the  deficit  will 
release  saving  now  soaked  up  by  government  borrowing,  thus  lowering  interest  rates  and  the  cost 
of  capital.  Most  parties  in  the  debate  USSWTE  that  such  an interest  rate  decline  will  spur  corporate 
investment  and  stimulate  economic  growth. 
However,  if the  sensitivity  of  investment  to changing  interest  rates  is weak  (as my  results  clearly 
show),  this  stimulative  effect  is  small.  The  assumption  that  lower  interest  rates  will  cause  an 
32 investment  boom  has  little  empirical  support,  especially  for  growing  firms.  But  the  deficit  will 
not  decline  in a vacuum.  As  is becoming  more  apparent  in Washington,  deficit  reduction  involves 
pain.  If  taxes  rise,  someone’s  disposable  income  will  be  lower,  and  firms’  sales  and  profits 
depressed.  Furthermore,  in  spite  of  the  popular  support  for  deficit  reduction  through  government 
spending  cuts,  a  dollar  reduction  in  government  spending  is  a  dollar  reduction  in  some  firm’s 
sales  or  someone’s  income.  Thus,  deficit  reduction,  whether  through  higher  taxes  or  lower 
spending,  depresses  sales  growth  and  firm  cash  flow.  The  evidence  shows  that  such  changes  will 
likely  have  a negative  impact  on  investment.25 
The  results  presented  here,  therefore,  contradict  much  of  the  conventional  wisdom  about  deficit 
reduction.  The  possible  boost  to investment  from  lower  deficits  and  lower  interest  rates  is  highly 
uncertain;  evidence  shows  that  it  may  be  minimal.  But  the  threats  of  deficit  reduction  for 
investment,  especially  in  an  economy  operating  well  below  full  employment  and  growing 
lethargically,  are  strongly  supported  by  the  statistical  evidence  (see  Table  2  for  more  details). 
Consequently,  the  policy  now  pursued  in  Washington  appears  risky.  Candidate  Bill  Clinton  (in 
his  second  debate  with  George  Bush  and  Ross  Perot)  appeared  to  have  a better  perspective  on 
the  benefits  and  costs  associated  with  deficit  reduction  than  President  Bill  Clinton  (whose  policy 
proposals  have  obviously  been  tempered  by  the  political  constraints  imposed  by  Congress, 
especially  by  an  effective  filibuster  threat  from  the  opposition).  The  candidate  argued  that  the 
deficit  was  not  the  only  or  even  the  chief  economic  evil.  While  there  undoubtedly  are  virtues  to 
a lower  deficit  over  some  horizon,  the  first  step  should  be  to  pursue  policies  to  restore  healthy 
33 economic  performance,  as candidate  Clinton  recognized.  Then,  in  a healthy  economy,  the  deficit 
could  be  tackled.26 
This  analysis  strongly  suggests  that  concerns  about  investment,  especially  in  an  economy  failing 
to  fully  utilize  its  labor  and  capital  resources,  should  not  stand  in  the  way  of  policy  initiatives 
that  have  important  social  value  but  that  may  also  increase  the  deficit.  Such  policies  include 
efforts  to  rebuild  American  infrastructure  and  to  invigorate  education.  As  Eisner  (1992)  argues, 
enhanced  infrastructure  and  education  will  likely  increase  the  productivity  of  private  capital  in 
the  long  run,  which  can  only  be  good  for  private  investment.  Policy  discussions  about  the  costs 
and  benefits  of  deficit  reduction  need  to  be  better  informed  about  the  relative  importance  of  the 
various  empirical  channels  through  which  the  government’s  budget  impacts  private  capital 
spending. 
A  third  lesson  from  the  results  presented  here  is  that  certain  kinds  of  policy  initiatives  designed 
to  lower  the  cost  of  capital,  especially  those  that  exclusively  focus  on  increasing  saving,  are  an 
unreliable  way  to  promote  investment.  Again,  it  is  often  taken  for  granted  that  more  saving 
implies  substantially  more  investment.  Theoretically,  this  link  occurs  because  higher  saving 
lowers  interest  rates  and  reduces  the  cost  of  capital.  A  large  effect  of  saving  on  investment, 
therefore,  requires  a  substantial  sensitivity  of  investment  to  the  cost  of  capital,  which  is  not 
strongly  supported  by  the data.  Indeed,  in weak  economic  conditions,  saving  initiatives  could  well 
do  more  harm  than  good.  More  saving  implies  less  consumption  and  weaker  aggregate  demand, 
with  lower  sales  growth  and  profits  following.  As  a result,  policies  that  increase  saving  could, 
34 paradoxically,  reduce  investment,  especially  over  a short  to  medium  horizon. 
Since  the  Clinton  administration  has  successfully  engineered  a tax  increase  on  relatively  wealthy 
individuals,  this  conclusion  is increasingly  relevant  to  the  current  debate  over  income  tax  policy. 
There  is  concern  that  higher  taxes  on  the  class  of  agents  that  do  the  most  saving  will  lower 
saving,  and  thus  reduce  investment.  But  since  this  process  must  work  through  the  cost-of-capital 
channel,  which  I  find  to  be  relatively  weak,  the  results  presented  here  suggest  little  need  for 
concern  that  higher  taxes  on  the  wealthy  will  have  any  deleterious  effects  on  the  level  of 
investment.” 
In  addition,  the  widespread  calls  for  a capital  gains  tax  cut  to  stimulate  investment  rely  on  the 
view  that  lower  taxes  on  the  returns  from  capital  will  lower  the  price  that  savers  require  to  make 
their  funds  available  to  investing  firms.28  While  this  idea  was  marshalled  by  the  Bush 
administration  and  Republican  members  of  Congress,  it  also  has  some  support  from  prominent 
Democrats.  In  fact,  a (relatively  weak)  capital  gains  tax break  remains  part  of  President  Clinton’s 
overhaul  of  fiscal  policy  (see  Endnote  5).  But  according  to  the  results  presented  here,  even  a 
spectacularly  successful  capital  gains  tax  cut-one  that  lowered  the  real  cost  of  capital  by  one 
or  two  percentage  points-would  have  a relatively  small  effect  on  investment  for  stagnant  and 
contracting  firms.  For  the  growing  firms  in the  economy,  there  is no clear  evidence  that  the  lower 
cost  of  capital  would  stimulate  investment.29 
35 On  a  more  positive  track,  because  uncertainty  still  exists  about  the  relative  strength  of  the 
determinants  of  investment,  we  should  look  for  “robust”  policy:  initiatives  that  will  be effective 
under  a number  of  different  views  about  how  the  investment  process  works.  Cuts  in  the  capital 
gains  tax  rate  do  not  qualify  as  a  robust  policy.  They  will  only  be  effective  if  investment  is 
sensitive  to  the  cost  of  capital.  More  broadly,  any  attempt  to  increase  investment  by  raising 
private  or  public  saving  will  not  be  a  robust  policy  because  it  relies  exclusively  on  the 
questionable  cost-of-capital  channel.  Consider  policies,  however,  that  put  more  cash  in  firms’ 
hands  such  as investment  tax  credits,  lower  corporate  income  taxes,  or accelerated  tax deductions 
for  capital  depreciation. 
These  policies  would  reduce  the  cost  of  capital.  But  they  also  will  increase  cash  flow  and  relax 
financial  constraints.30  This  effect  could  well  be  more  important  for  investment  than  the  lower 
cost  of  capital,  especially  in  new  high-technology  firms  that  are  most  likely  to  face  financial 
constraints  (see  Fazzari,  Hubbard,  and  Petersen,  1988a).  Similar  arguments  can  be made  in  favor 
of  research  and  development  credits  (see  Himmelberg  and  Petersen,  1994).  The  fundamental 
question  is:  Why  should  we  pursue  policies-which  have  no  strong  empirical  support  for  their 
effectiveness  and  usually  have  regressive  distributional  consequences-to  tinker  only  with  the 
cost  of  capital,  when  we  have  the  means  to  boost  investment  with  policies  that  are  effective 
through  a number  of  different  channels? 
Economic  ideas  matter  for  policy.  But  the  particular  ideas  that  dominate  policy  debates  at  any 
point  in time  are not  necessarily  those  with  the  strongest  empirical  support.  The  view  that  interest 
36 rates  and  cost  of  capital  constitute  the  most  important  policy  lever  for  the  determination  of 
private  investment  is,  unfortunately,  an  example  of  a dominant  hypothesis  that  underlies  current 
policy  positions  even  though  it  lacks  strong  empirical  support  in  the  research  presented  here.  I 
have  argued  that  in  the  light  of  new  evidence  about  the  determinants  of  investment,  the  policy 
discussion  should  place  greater  weight  on cyclical  movements  of the macroeconomy  and  financial 
conditions  of the  corporate  sector,  and  less  emphasis  on  the  cost-of-capital  channel.  I believe  such 
a shift  of  emphasis  offers  the  best  chance  in  the  short  run  to restore  healthy  capital  growth  to  the 
U.S.  economy,  with  corresponding  benefits  for  output,  employment,  productivity,  and  wages. 
37 Appendix  A 
Econometric  Study 
Dejinition  of Sales-Growth  Classes 
To  limit  the  effect  of  extreme  observations  in  the  classification  of  firms,  annual  real  sales  growth 
figures  in  each  year  were  capped  between  negative  20  and  positive  20  percent.  These  limited 
sales  growth  data  were  then  averaged  for  each  firm.  Firms  were  put  into  the  negative-growth 
class  if  their  average  was  less  than  negative  1 percent.  The  zero-growth  class  includes  averages 
from  negative  1  percent  to  positive  2  percent.  Moderate  growth  covers  2  to  7  percent,  and 
high-growth  firms  had  real  sales  growth  that  averaged  over  7 percent. 
Data Definitions 
Investment  (I)  is  capital  spending  on  plant  and  equipment  from  the  firms’  sources  and  uses  of 
funds  statements.  Sales  (S)  is  total  revenue  from  operations  less  discounts  or  returns.  Cash  flow 
(CF)  includes  after-tax  profits,  depreciation  and  amortization  expense,  extraordinary  items,  and 
deferred  taxes.  The  sales  data  were  deflated  by the  GNP  deflator.  Cash  flow  and  investment  were 
deflated  by  the  implicit  deflator  for  nonresidential  fixed  investment. 
The  capital  stock  (K)  calculations  used  estimates  of  capital  price  inflation  and  economic 
depreciation  to  calculate  a  replacement  value  of  capital.  The  method  used  was  similar  to  that 
reported  in  Fazzari,  Hubbard,  and  Petersen  (1988b)  with  modifications  to  better  account  for 
38 acquisitions  and  divestitures  and  to measure  depreciation  more  robustly.  Further  details  about  this 
calculation  are  available  from  the  author. 
The  interest  rate  data  used  in  the  regressions  reported  in  the  text  are  the  average  yields  on 
corporate  bonds  carrying  Baa  ratings  taken  from  the  199 1 Economic Report  of the President.  The 
percentage  change  in  the  real  financial  cost  of  capital  (PCR),  adjusted  for  expected  inflation  and 
the  deductibility  of  nominal  interest  on  corporate  tax  returns  is  taken  from  Chirinko  and  Fazzari 
(1993).  Additional  tests  were  conducted  using  one-year  Treasury  bill  rates  (real  and  nominal). 
The  results  for  these  alternative  variables  indicated  weaker  cost  of  capital  effects  than  those  for 
the  real  Baa  rates,  and  there  was  virtually  no  effect  of  using  the  alternative  changes  in  the 
financial  cost  of  capital  variables  on  the  other  results  reported  in  the  text. 
Regression  Sample  Selection  Criteria 
All  available  annual  data  from  COMPUSTAT  for  manufacturing  firms  (SIC  codes  20 to  39)  were 
put  into  the  initial  sample.  The  version  of  COMPUSTAT  used  to  construct  the  sample  included 
information  from  1971  through  1990.  The  1971  through  1973  data  were  used  to  construct  lags 
and  therefore  the  regression  sample  covers  1974-1990.  Some  observations  were  deleted  because 
of major  mergers,  or large  inconsistencies  in the  accounting  information.  The  regressions  reported 
in the  sample  exclude  outliers  of  the  ratios  used  in the  regressions  defined  as follows:  investment 
to  capital  (ILK) exceeding  2.0;  real  sales  growth  (SG)  less  than  -75  percent  or  greater  than  200 
percent  in  a  given  year;  cash  flow  to  capital  (CF/K)  less  than  -2.5  or  greater  than  2.5.  These 
limitations  reduced  the  sample  by  just  over  5 percent.  The  regression  results  were  much  more 
39 robust  after  removing  the  outliers,  especially  for  sales  growth.  The  cash  flow  and  cost  of  capital 
variables  performed  in  similar  ways  in the  full  sample  and  limited  samples.  Tighter  sample  limits 
than  those  used  for  the  reported  regressions  did  not  change  the  results  materially. 
Regression  Specification  and  Estimation 
The  estimated  regression  equations  had  the  form: 
(I/K)j,  =  aj +  (a,,)  SGj, +  (a,,)  SGj,1  +  (a,,)  SGjt-2 
+  (a&  (CFK)j,  +  (a&  (CFK)j,,  +  (a,,)  (CFK)jt-, 
+  (a&  PCRtel  +  (a&  PCR,, 
where  the  variables  are  defined  as above.  The  “a”  symbols  represent  estimated  coefficients.  The 
j  subscript  indicates  different  firms;  t  indexes  time  periods.  The  ratios  used  for  I/K  and  CF/K 
make  these  variables  dimensionally  equivalent  to  SG  and  PCR.  This  kind  of  specification  also 
controls  for  the  heteroscedasticity  that  would  be  substantial  in  firm  data  if  the  regression  were 
run  using  the  level  of  investment  rather  than  the  investment-capital  ratio.  Because  the  intercept 
term  was  allowed  to  vary  across  firms,  the  estimator  used  captures  time-series  variation  (the 
“within”  fixed-effects  estimator  for  panel  data).  The  regression  results  reported  in  the  text  are  the 
sum  of  the  coefficients  on  the  contemporaneous  and  two  annual  lags  for  each  variable  except 
PCR.  The  contemporaneous  value  of  PCR  was  dropped  from  the  regression  because  simultaneity 
could  have  affected  the  estimation  of  this  coefficient.  When  the  contemporaneous  PCR  variable 
was  included,  it  had  a  positive  effect  on  investment  in  all  the  regressions.  Thus,  excluding 
40 contemporaneous  PCR  makes  the  cost  of  capital  effect  more  negative,  increasing  the  strength  of 
the  conventional  cost-of-capital  effect. 
Up  to  four  annual  lags  of  all  the  variables  were  also  included  in  alternative  regressions.  The 
longer  lags  did  increase  the  sums  of  the  SG  and  CF/K  variables.  Longer  lags  of  PCR,  however, 
made  their  sums  less  negative.  Therefore,  basing  the  analysis  on  the  shorter  lag  specification 
increases  the  relative  size  of  the  cost-of-capital  effect.  Including  a lagged  dependent  variable  also 
had  little  effect  on  the  results,  suggesting  that  serial  correlation  is  not  an  important  problem. 
41 Regression  Results 
Complete  regression  results  for  the  specification  analyzed  in  the  text  follow.  The  estimated  t 
statistics  for  the  null  hypothesis  that  the  coefficient  on  each  variable  is  zero  are  in  parentheses 
below  the  parameter  estimates. 
Dependent  Variable:  (vK)j, 
Ind.  Negative 
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42 The  adjusted  R-squared  figures  do  not  include  the  explanatory  power  of  the  firm  fixed  effects. 
As  mentioned  in  the  text,  it is clear  that  the  statistical  significance  of  the  SG  and  CF/K  variables 
is  much  stronger  than  the  cost  of  capital  variables. 
43 Appendix  B 
As  found  by  other  studies,  the  sales  growth  (accelerator  effects)  are  very  strong.  Also  the  cash 
flow  effects  that  capture  the  impact  of  financial  constraints  are  quite  important.  Both  the  sales 
growth  and  cash  flow  effects  are  much  stronger  for  the  faster-growing  firms,  a  result  that  we 
shall  discuss  in  more  detail  in  a  moment.  One  can  overwhelmingly  reject  the  hypothesis  that 
these  effects  are  in  fact  zero,  with  the  positive  estimated  effect  due  simply  to  random  variation. 
These  results  leave  no  doubt  about  the  importance  of  sales  growth  and  cash  flow  as determinants 
of  investment. 
Table  3  Summary  of  the  Estimated  Impact  of  Investment  Determinants  on  the 
Investment-to-Capital  Ratio 
By  Sales-Growth  Class 
Growth 
Class 
Independent  Variables 
Sales  Cash  Percent  Change  of 
Growth  Flow  Capital  Costs 
Negative  0.145  0.149  - 0.033 
Zero  0.159  0.185  - 0.023 
Moderate  0.247  0.232  +0.05 1 
High  0.267  0.300  +o. 137 
Source:  Author’s  calculations  from  the  COMPUSTAT  manufacturing  firm  database.  The  figures 
are  the  sum  of  the  regression  coefficients  for  the  independent  variables.  See  Appendix  A  for 
specification  details  and  t statistics. 
44 Endnotes 
1.  In  principle,  tax  changes  to  stimulate  saving  need  not  be  regressive.  For  example,  a 
consumption  tax  with  steeply  increasing  tax rates  as consumption  rises  could  increase  the 
progressivity  of  federal  taxes  for  many  individuals.  In  practice,  however,  most  proposals 
that  have  been  put  on  the  table  to  increase  saving,  the  capital  gains  tax  cut  in  particular, 
provide  greater  benefits  to  individuals  with  higher  incomes. 
2.  This  “gross”  measure  of  investment  includes  capital  spending  that  replaces  depreciated 
capital.  Conceptually,  “net”  investment,  which  excludes  depreciation,  may  provide  a better 
measure  of  the  growth  of  productive  capital.  But  the  statistical  adjustments  made  to 
account  for  depreciation  are controversial.  Recent  net  investment  data  have  a much  more 
pronounced  downward  trend. 
3.  This  assumption  is  quite  standard,  but  it  can  be  questioned,  especially  if  the  economy  is 
operating  below  full  employment.  I assume  here  that  deficits  do  increase  real  interest  rates 
and  then  I estimate  the  effect  of  this  increase  on  investment.  If  deficits  do  not  increase 
real  interest  rates  substantially,  the  analysis  presented  here  still  applies,  but  the  focus  of 
the  policy  discussion  will  be  somewhat  different. 
4.  The  Tax  Reform  Act  of  1986  removed  the  personal  tax  exclusion  for  capital  gains 
income.  Nevertheless,  capital  gains  income  still enjoys  a substantial  tax  advantage  because 
shareholders  can  defer  tax  on  the  increase  in  the  value  of  assets  until  they  sell  these 
45 assets,  and  heirs  pay  no  capital  gains  taxes  on  assets  held  until  death.  The  size  of  this 
benefit  rises  the  longer  one  holds  an  appreciating  asset.  See  Auerbach  (1992)  for  further 
discussion.  As  mentioned  previously,  the  tax  reform  passed  by  Congress  in  the  summer 
of  1993  expands  the  tax  preference  for  capital  gains  income  because  it raises  tax  rates  on 
other  kinds  of  income  for  wealthy  taxpayers. 
5.  See,  for  example,  the  treatment  in  Jorgenson  and  Yun  (1989).  A  less  technical 
explanation  for  many  of  these  tax  adjustments  and  a discussion  of how  they  were  affected 
by  the  Tax  Reform  Act  of  1986  can  be  found  in  Fazzari  (1987). 
6.  More  recently,  much  empirical  work  on  investment  has  focused  on  the  estimation  of 
“Euler  equations”  derived  from  explicit  dynamic  models  of firm  value  maximization.  This 
work  is  not  particularly  relevant  for  the  discussion  here  since  the  structure  of  Euler 
equations  usually  imposes  an  important  role  for  the  cost  of  capital  rather  than  testing  this 
impact.  Furthermore,  the  assumptions  that  underlie  the  Euler  equation  approach  are  often 
rejected  empirically. 
7.  Further  stimulus  to  private  investment  from  infrastructure  spending  will  arise  if  public 
capital  enhances  the  productivity  of  private  capital.  For  example,  better  water  and  sewer 
systems  probably  increase  the  productivity  of  manufacturing  plants.  Robert  Eisner  (1992) 
46 makes  similar  arguments. 
8.  The  primary  stabilizing  factor  is  price  adjustment.  The  relevant  references  are  too 
numerous  to  include  here.  See  Caskey  and  Fazzari  (1987)  and  Tobin  (1993)  for  more 
information. 
9.  This  point  is  an  application  of  the  more  general  concept  of  “first-mover”  advantages;  its 
relevance  for  the  link  between  investment  and  finance  is discussed  in Fazzari  and  Petersen 
(1993). 
10.  Although  the  resurgence  of  interest  in  this  topic  is  relatively  new  in  the  economic 
mainstream,  it  is  prominent  in  earlier  ideas  about  investment,  going  back  at  least  to 
Keynes  (1936).  Also  see  Meyer  and  Kuh  (1957)  and  Minsky  (1975).  For  a more  extensive 
discussion  of  the  ideas  and  results  presented  here,  and  for  additional  references,  see 
Fazzari,  Hubbard,  and  Petersen  (1988b). 
11.  From  1971  through  1990,  the  correlation  between  real  growth  in  corporate  profits  and 
GNP  was  73  percent.  Over  the  same  period,  a  one  percentage  point  change  in  GNP 
growth  was  associated  with  just  under  a five  percentage  point  change  in  corporate  profit 
growth.  See  Carpenter,  Fazzari,  and  Petersen  (1993)  for  further  discussion. 
47 12.  See  Bernanke  and  Lown  (1991)  for  a  statistical  analysis  of  the  credit  squeeze  and 
discussion  of  its  potential  causes. 
13.  Gertler  and  Hubbard  (1988)  find  support  for  the  view  that  financial  conditions  constrain 
investment  more  tightly  in  recessions. 
14.  This  argument  is  discussed  in  detail  and  supported  by  empirical  evidence  in  Fazzari  and 
Petersen  (1993).  Also  see  the  analysis  in  Carpenter,  Fazzari,  and  Petersen  (1993). 
15.  Because  of  changes  in the  number  of  firms  tracked  over  time,  the  proportion  of  aggregate 
fixed  investment  covered  by  the  sample  changes.  It peaks  at 49.2  percent  in  1981,  and  the 
low  point  is  36.1  percent  in  1973. 
16.  Most  accelerator  models  relate  the  level  of  investment  to  the  level  or  the  difference  in 
sales.  At  the  firm  level,  however,  this  relation  depends  on  the  firm’s  capital-output  ratio. 
This  ratio  can  differ  substantially  across  firms.  Under  the  assumption  that  the 
capital-output  ratio  is  constant  for  a  particular  firm,  but  not  the  same  across  firms,  the 
relation  between  the  investment-capital  ratio  and  sales  growth  captures  the  accelerator 
effect. 
17.  See  Fazzari,  Hubbard,  and  Petersen  (1988b)  and  Fazzari  and  Petersen  (1993)  for  extensive 
discussion  of  how  to  interpret  the  cash  flow-investment  link.  In  particular,  these  papers 
48 analyze  how  to  distinguish  financial  effects  on  investment  from  the  possible  role  played 
by  cash  flow  as  a proxy  for  factors  that  shift  investment  demand. 
18.  One  must  assume  a functional  form  for  the  regression  equation.  It is usually  linear,  which 
can  be  viewed  as  a general  approximation  to  more  complicated  functions. 
19.  Another  approach  to  address  the  Lucas  critique  employs  economic  theory  to  derive 
empirical  specifications  that  allow  estimation  of  parameters  that  do  not  vary  with  policy 
changes.  But  one  can  usually  identify  such  specifications  only  under  restrictive 
assumptions.  The  particular  issues  involved  are  beyond  the  scope  of  this  paper.  Briefly, 
to  capture  the  effects  of  a  variety  of  important  issues  (the  importance  of  financial 
constraints  or  heterogeneity  across  different  kinds  of  firms,  for  example),  it  would  be 
difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  use  an  approach  that  solved  the  problems  of  the  Lucas 
critique  in  all  respects.  Moreover,  attempts  to  overcome  some  of  the  Lucas  critique 
problems  along  these  lines  would  necessarily  impose  very  restrictive  assumptions  on  the 
analysis,  which  have  often  been  rejected  in  other  empirical  work  on  investment. 
20.  I considered  an  observation  in  a high-technology  industry  if  the  firm’s  primary  standard 
industrial  classification  (SIC)  two-digit  code  was  28  (chemicals),  35  (machinery),  36 
(electrical  components),  or  38  (instruments).  See  Himmelberg  and  Petersen  (1994)  for  a 
further  discussion  of  these  industries  and  additional  references. 
49 21.  See,  for  example,  the  article  “Economists  Expect  Impact  of  Plan  Will  Be  Limited,”  Wall 
Street  Journal,  August  9,  1993,  p.  A4  by  Rick  Wartzman  and  Lucinda  Harper.  The 
economists  surveyed  in  this  article  predict  a reduction  in  real  economic  growth  of  0.25 
to  1.00  percentage  points. 
22.  Carpenter,  Fazzari,  and  Petersen  (1993)  report  that  cash  flow  is  four  to  five  times  more 
volatile  than  sales  (using  coefficients  of  variation). 
23.  This  calculation  was  based  on  the  Merrill  Lynch  Bond  Indexes,  averaging  across 
maturities  and  quality.  The  data  were  taken  from  page  Cl6  of  the  Wall  Street  Journal, 
August  13,  1993. 
24. 
25.  The  link  between  deficits  and  firm  cash  flow  and  profits  was  a  key  element  of  the 
These  effects  refer  only  to business  fixed  capital  investment.  They  do  not  include  possible 
stimulus  to  residential  investment  resulting  from  lower  interest  rates.  Also,  the  simulated 
effects  do  not  account  for  the  possibility  that  lower  interest  rates  might  help  investment 
indirectly  by  increasing  cash  flow.  Estimating  this  effect  would  require  additional 
equations  that  are  beyond  the  scope  of  this  study.  Note,  however,  that  even  if  this 
feedback  effect  were  to  completely  offset  reduced  cash  flow,  the  simulated  net  impact  on 
investment  from  deficit  reduction  would  remain  negative  for  the  moderate-  and 
high-growth  firms  that  account  for  about  79  percent  of  investment  in  the  sample. 
50 economic  analysis  of  Jerome  Levy.  See  Levy  and  Levy  (1983). 
26.  It  should  be  noted  that  the  Clinton  administration,  consistent  with  the  candidate’s  stance 
in  the  campaign,  did  pursue  an  economic  stimulus  package  in  advance  of  deficit 
reduction,  albeit  a small  one.  This  measure  was  killed  in  the  Congress,  however.  Two  of 
the  substantive  concerns  about  the  deficit  are  the  regressive  distributional  effect  of 
broad-based  taxes  levied  to  pay  interest  on  the  national  debt  and  the  international 
distributional  consequences  of  foreign  holding  of  U.S.  government  assets.  In  addition,  if 
reduced  deficits  do  lower  interest  rates,  deficit  reduction  could  reduce  the  exchange  value 
of  the  dollar  and  bolster  exports  and  international  competitiveness. 
27.  If  personal  tax  increases  reduce  consumption,  they  will  weaken  the  economy  and  hurt 
investment  through  the  strong  sales  growth  and  cash  flow  channels.  It  is likely,  however, 
that  by  targeting  tax  increases  more  toward  the  wealthy,  the  depressing  effects  of  lower 
consumption  will  be  less  severe  relative  to  what  might  occur  after  a  broad-based  tax 
increase. 
28.  Some  economists  have  suggested  that  the  capital  gains  tax  rate  operates  through  an 
alternative  channel  by  stimulating  venture  capital.  A  detailed  analysis  of  this  idea  is 
beyond  the  scope  of  this  paper.  I note,  however,  that  venture  capital  accounts  for  a very 
small  proportion  of  investment  finance  in  the  U.S.  Moreover,  the  benefits  from  an overall 
capital  gains  tax  cut  would  accrue  overwhelmingly  to  the  owners  of  assets  that  do  not 
51 qualify  in  any  sense  as  venture  capital. 
29.  Another  argument  often  made  for  cutting  capital  gains  taxes  is  that  the  allocation  of 
investment  will  be  improved  by  lowering  what  is  often  called  the  “lock-in”  effect. 
Because  capital  gains  are  taxed  only  when  assets  are  sold,  the  capital  gains  tax  creates  an 
incentive  to  hold  on  to  assets  longer  than  might  be  optimal.  But  as  Auerbach  (1992) 
discusses,  this  problem  could  be  solved  by  taxing  capital  gains  at  the  time  they  are 
accrued  rather  than  when  they  are realized  by asset  sales  (effectively  increasing  the  capital 
gains  tax  rate).  The  lock-in  effect  alone  is  not  an  effective  justification  for  lower  capital 
gains  tax  rates. 
30.  William  Vickrey  (1992,  p,  307)  favors  cutting  or  eliminating  corporate  taxes  as opposed 
to  capital  gains  initiatives  for  similar  reasons.  One  way  to  understand  this  issue  more 
formally  is  to  recognize  that  in  the  conventional  view,  taxes  on  marginal  investment  are 
what  matter.  But  if  a tax  cut  is more  important  empirically  for  investment  because  lower 
taxes  increase  cash  flow,  rather  than  because  lower  taxes  reduce  the  cost  of  capital,  the 
average  tax  burden  on  firms  is what  matters.  This  point  is made  by  Fazzari,  Hubbard,  and 
Petersen  (1988a).  Petersen  (1991)  provides  empirical  evidence  that  the  cash  flow  impact 
of  tax  cuts  is  indeed  important  for  investment.  See  Meyer,  Prakken,  and  Varvares  (1993) 
for  a  balanced  discussion  about  the  marginal  and  average  effects  of  an  increase  in  the 
investment  tax  credit. 
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